Proliferation Press

A webpage devoted to tracking and analyzing current events related to the proliferation of WMD/CBRN.

Archive for May, 2009

Blog-On-Blog: Accessing Jennifer Rubin’s Charge that Obama Triangulates U.S. National Security

Posted by K.E. White on May 22, 2009

At Contentions Jennifer Rubin sifts through the aftermath of yesterday’s Obama-Cheney duel. She takes a firm line: accusing President Obama of a “triangulation game on national security” and being a “president who seems intent on getting the politics right and worrying about the policy later.”

Her specific charge? Obama seeks good politics and not good policy when calling for the end of advanced interrogation techniques and the GITMO closure. These decisions fall into Obama’s ovreall governing strategy, which Rubin describes as: “…to soothe all parties and charm even the most virulent foes of the United States has been Obama’s lifelong modus operand.”

This article will contend the following: First, Rubin fails to show evidence of actual triangulation, only that Obama is discussing security policies that she does not agree with at a time of conflicted public and partisan opinion. Second, she confuses the tools used to advance national security (e.g. what do we do with terrorists suspected of threatening America once detained) with national security priorities (e.g. how America should effectively beat back the terrorist threat).

First, her portrayal of Obama as bargaining between two extremes—hawks and doves in Congress and the public—flys in the face of commonsense, not to mention the substance of Obama’s address yesterday. When Obama evoked the ‘middle’ in yesterday’s speech he was not discussing how he chooses national security priorities, but how transparent and checked executive decisions on national security should be. (While this is a related matter, it is not tantamount to stating: ‘Well some people like GITMO, others don’t—so let’s just move it to Montana and ban torture to whip up libreal support!’) Obama’s positions presupposed the judgement that advanced interrogation techniques and GITMO’s continued operation harm American security. Accessing these decisions is separate from evoking them as triangulation.

By blurring the tools used to obtain national security with actual policies—which, admittedly, can overlap—Rubin is guilty of begging the question. She overlooks this glaring weakness with the Cheney position: the policies instituted by the Bush White House were of questionable effectiveness, controversial at home and grounded on dubious legal reasoning.

It is unquestionable that GITMO, whatever its merits, hurt America’s image around the world. Why then is Rubin so quick to portray Obama’s move to close GITMO as simply a gimmick to get Left-leaning support on other issues? By dodging the issue of whether or not moving detainees from GITMO to a Super-Max prison has any impact on American security, this implication rests on unstated, if not flimsy, assumptions.

Having an unclear standard by which to hold onto detainees has clear dangers. So why when Obama outlines his desire to codify in law their continued detention–even if thise means indefinite detention without recourse to a federal or military court–does Rubin imply this as a cynical attempt at assuaging the Right? This has particular resonance when contrasted with the ad hoc and hasty basis by which the Bush White House released past detainees.

It’s easy to see where Rubin goes wrong within her own post: she uses another writer’s perception that Obama is appealing to a fractured middle ground between doves and hawks that may or may not support them as as proof that Obama has politicized/triangulated national security policy. But even that speculation, if right, fails to prove triangulation. Proving triangulation requires showing incoherent or ineffective policy coming out of the White House in response to opinion polls.

Now, admittedly, I have set a high bar. But it seems next to impossible  to even suggest this in regards to current Obama administration national security actions. Yes, decisions on whether or not to prosecute Bush administration officials and releasing certain detainee photographs have changed. But those changes do not seem the result of public or partisan pressure. They seemed, whether right or wrong, rooted within an evolving sense of what constituted the national interest. While this process can be messy, it’s understandable on issues where there is no readily apparent ‘correct’ course of action.

Furthermore, Bush White House terror prosecutions and detainee photographs do not repreesnt the core of yesterday’s Cheney-Obama debate. The main issues at play are: 1) where to treat and place current and future terror detainees and 2) whether or not to use advanced interrogation techniques on suspected or known terrorists.

On these two issues any charge of triangulation fails. (Note: by triangulation I mean creating policy out of incoherent or contradictory positions to manufacture a public mandate.) Obama started his administration by bucking against political pressure and an unsure public will in ordering the shutdown of GITMO, the cessation of advanced interrogation methods, and the designing of transparent system of detention and prosecution. In yesterday’s speech, after weeks of criticism by the Right and the failure to obtain Congressional funds to close GITMO, what did Obama do? He stuck to his guns.

This suggests a President more interested in forging a sound national security policy than worrying whether or not it is popular to stop certain tools to deliver that end (i.e. certain interrogation techniques and detainee transfers out of GITMO).

Yes, these policies require politics. Closing GITMO requires votes in Congress; ending torture policies demands a President who shows the public why this change is justified; and reconstituting military tribunals and maintaining long-term detentions require congressional action. In no way do these actions prove Rubin’s charge of “triangulation”.

But it’s hard to argue with Rubin on substance. Nowhere in Rubin’s posting is discussion over what makes up the current “national security debate” she considers so important. (I am left to assume this debate expands to detention policies, torture policies and GITMO policies, and not, for example, the US-UAE nuclear deal or current AfPak policy). By failing discuss these policies Rubin (whether by choice or shoddy rhetoric) fails to show whether or not Obama-desired policies help or hinder American security. Hence, Rubin cannot offer a set of policies Obama ‘should’ pursue but has abandoned in order to secure public approval.

But the above assumes Rubin’s post to be a reasoned and dispassionate critique of the Obama administration. Rubin’s final paragraph squashes any such illusion. There she compares Obama’s discussion and desired reform of Bush-era detention and interrogation techniques with the hypothetical case of a President going into war to quell domestic critics. This, on its face, stands as a grossly false comparison. And it only highlights Rubin’s refusal to engage in actual discussion–not to mention here comfort in passing flawed logic off as refined argument.

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Proliferation Press Round-Up: Cheney and Obama Butt Heads Over Torture and GITMO; PONI Gives START its Due; Obama Signs US-UAE Nuclear Deal; China Modernizes Its Nuclear Arsenal

Posted by K.E. White on May 22, 2009

P. Press verdict: With these considerable monitoring stipulations attached, DeThomas’ practicality wins out. While it would be preferable to grant American nuclear technology assistance by a generalizable formula applicable to all nations and keep all dangerous nuclear technology out of the Middle East, these are unrealistic policy positions.  With the NPT conference approaching and Iran’s continued nuclear defiance, strong inducements exist for America to showcase its commitment to assisting the peaceful spread of nuclear technology—especially to nations in the Middle East.

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Obama vs. Cheney: Is There A Middle Ground When It Comes to America’s War on Terror?

Posted by proliferationpresswm on May 21, 2009

The following is an opinion piece that reviews and analyzes the speeches made today by President Barack Obama and former Vice President Dick Cheney. For a quick review of the various claims in each speech, check this Politico article. David Biespiel offers excellent commentary on this same topic.

Talk about night and day. President Obama and former Vice President Dick Cheney went at it today, and there dueling speeches framed the debate over America’s national security.

After adsorbing the speeches, it’s hard not to be left wondering just why Republicans see national security as their most potent weapon against President Obama. And that has nothing to do with the messenger, but rather the message itself.

Cheney, speaking at AEI, mounted an impassioned and absolutist defense of all actions undertaken by the Bush administration in the war against terror. He sought to portray the Obama administration’s current approach to national security as weak-kneed, hypocritical and politically self-serving.

Cheney brought back the pre- and post-9-11 framework that dominated the Bush White House. He implicitly argued that the Obama administration—by junking the terms ‘war on terror’ and ‘enemy combatant’  and stopping the use of advanced interrogation techniques and shutting down GITMO—put forward a “boarder misconception” of the threats that face America.

But what’s most notable in Cheney’s polemic is its unflinching refusal to differentiate between the various aspects of Bush-era national security:

So we’re left to draw one of two conclusions – and here is the great dividing line in our current debate over national security. You can look at the facts and conclude that the comprehensive strategy has worked, and therefore needs to be continued as vigilantly as ever. Or you can look at the same set of facts and conclude that 9/11 was a one-off event – coordinated, devastating, but also unique and not sufficient to justify a sustained wartime effort. Whichever conclusion you arrive at, it will shape your entire view of the last seven years, and of the policies necessary to protect America for years to come.

Cheney’s dividing line is not only false, but dangerous. A reading of Cheney’s speech reveals “comprehensive strategy” to mean  all the following as necessary parts of defending the United States from terrorism:

A. The war in Afghanistan. No one would argue against this; yet, one may wonder why the Bush administration failed for years ensure the resources required for success. But in all fairness, Cheney did give Obama credit for redoubling American efforts in Afghanistan.

B. The war in Iraq. Yes, Dick Cheney defends this war on the grounds of battling terrorism. He sneaks in mention of  Saddam’s Hussein’s “known ties to Midest terrorists” while discussing the threats America faed after 9-11. Is this still really a question?

C. Advanced Interrogation Methods. Here Cheney devotes his most attention: arguing that the still-unreleased CIA memos would show just how valuable these limited programs were. And he continues to argue that Obama’s selective release detailing these practices hurts American security. To these charges, two questions: A) Just because advanced interrogation methods worked, does that mean they were the only way forward—let alone were they justified in a way that made them legally unsustainable? B) Did releasing memos detailing (now prohibited) practices already admitted to by the Bush administration really teach current or future terrorists something new? (Answer: No.)

D. GITMO. Here Cheney focuses on the most inane aspect of this important security debate. Does he discuss the untenable legal foundation GITMO was found on? No. Does Cheney concede that mistakes were made by is administration’s ad hoc treatment of the issue—leading to the release of prisoners who then continued to actively battle the United States under his watch? No. Or how about how GITMO became a symbol for an administration wanting wishing to act above the law and our nation’s system of checks-and-balances ? No. Instead he states the following:

Attorney General Holder and others have admitted that the United States will be compelled to accept a number of terrorists here, in the homeland, and it has even been suggested US taxpayer dollars will be used to support them. On this one, I find myself in complete agreement with many in the President’s own party. Unsure how to explain to their constituents why terrorists might soon be relocating to their states, these Democrats chose instead to strip funding for such a move out of the most recent war supplemental.

On the point of US taxpayer dollars being used to “support” former GITMO detainees: American tax dollars already “support” terrorists held in GITMO. Unless Dick Cheney is arguing to cease funding GITMO, this seems a non-issue. Second, the suggestion that suspected terrorists cannot be held on American soil appears little more than politically convenient fear-mongering. Why can America not hold dangerous terrorists on American soil? We do now.  And we already have facilities specifically designed for this very purpose.

One can understand why the image of 9-11 burns so brightly for Dick Cheney. Not only was he Vice President during the attacks, but was only a month latter sent to a secret location to head-up a secret, back-up federal government. Why? The CIA feared an imminent nuclear attack on New York City. Those were scary times, and we still live in them.

What is not comprehensible is the former Vice President’s refusal to admit that not every policy enacted after 9-11 actually served to prevent future terrorist attacks. And his insistence that anyone who voices this position as forgetting 9-11 is ludicrous.

Obama’s speech: Finding A Middle-Ground Between Security and Transparency

Against this black-and-white approach to the war on terror, Obama offered a full-throated defense of his administration’s actions.

In discussing the use of advanced interrogation methods, Obama staked his credibility on his belief these tactics—whatever their value—caused more harm than good for the United States. Now this might be an endlessly debated question. But the President has decided. While some may disagree, Obama has staked his credibility as commander-in-chief on this issue. And it seems reasonable to believe he has done so because there are other avenues through which to obtain this information that do not carry the dangerous spill-over effects of advanced interrogation techniques.

On GITMO, Obama pitched a nuanced and comprehensive plan. The boiled-down version? Those detainees who cannot be released, transfered to other countries, or brought before federal court or military tribunals will face continued detainment. The crucial difference is this: clear standards will be created and periodic reviews made as to why these individuals should be detained and for what duration. Besides the question of where in the US these individuals should be placed—an inane, if publicly potent issue— one may be left wondering what exactly Cheney has against this move.

Unless Cheney truly believes that only the executive branch, not the US court system or US Congress, can be trusted with issues of national security. And even then, it seems that crafting standards might be needed if a President is elected who doesn’t follow Cheney’s personal viewpoint. (Perhaps this is something the Bush-Cheney White House should have done themselves)

Not only are suspected terrorists either facing justice or being detained under the Obama approach, checks-and-balances will be instituted that ensure careful decision-making. Such careful decision-making probably would have avoided the Bush-Cheney administration’s earlier and careless release of GITMO detainees.

But the most telling difference in Obama’s speech was its ability to break-out of Cheney’s binary world-view. In Cheney’s post 9-11 framework extreme actions were and still are necessary to defend the United States. If mistakes happen while prusuing this mission, they are not mistakes. Any difference of opinion must necessarily equate to a less safe America.

Obama argued for a middle-ground. A middle-ground that still recognizes America is at war and must protect itself, but also accepts that not every action considered or undertaken in this mission inherently effective. Closing GITMO and transferring prisoners to American soil does not endanger American security. And letting detainees languish in GITMO in the face of legal challenges amounts to the President picking and choosing what laws to apply. While one can argue what value GITMO is to terrorist recruiters, one pernicious truth remains: America’s system of laws in undermined while yielding no added security to American citizens.

Conclusion: Is This Really the Rallying Cry of The Right?

If conservatives really wish to base their foreign policy on maintaining GITMO and using advanced interrogation techniques, they have made themselves a party of the past. Yes, terrorists will continue to be detained and interrogated. But it’s virtually assured that any valuable information from these suspected terrorists can be obtained through other means. Furthermore, there’s no rational basis to fear placing any such dangerous individuals in super-max prisons in the United States–prisons developed actually for this purpose.

From Obama Americans heard a confident president defending his conception of American foreign policy and homeland security. In so doing, he acknowledged that these questions were difficult and that there were no easy answers. And, indeed, his plan for GITMO prisoners detainees modifies, but does not fundamentally reverse the Bush-era view on detention. Furthermore, Obama banned enhanced interrogation techniques, but has reserved the power to bring them back. But even if his approach is not perfect, he is having an open discussion over how America should protect itself and attempting to create clear and public standards for American actions.

Cheney preferred to defend every action of the Bush administration, admitting no error. By lumping all Bush-era national security decisions together and refusing to acknowledge the inherent difficulties of maintaining specific policies his White House promulgated, Cheney substituted real discussion for rhetorical flash–answers for partisan point-making.

This is not to say Obama shyed away from partisan notes himself. Or that every decision Obama has made or will make will be 100 percent correct. But in showing a willingness to reveal and discuss America’s security policies, Obama had already won. Cheney argued for a system where the ‘right’ President should always be trusted and allowed to conceal their administration’s actions. (Cheney has no answer for what contingency there is against poor executive decisions.) Obama offered a, however imperfect, conception of national security where standards are known and executive power is subject to review.

The winning argument is clear. It’s the one that actually makes sense.

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Pakistan: Is Engineering Civic Engagement Needed To Ensure Effective U.S. Military and Humanitarian Aid?

Posted by K.E. White on May 20, 2009

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s description of US policy toward Pakistan as “incoherent” caught US airwaves for its frankness–or, perhaps to some, apologist tone. But more importantly, Clinton’s press conference highlights a much tougher question: how does America make a coherent policy towards Pakistan?

Right now the stakes in Pakistan are high, but the mission is clear: help Pakistan’s civilian government beat back the extremist threat and, in so doing, strengthen liberal rule in the country and route dangerous terrorist groups that promise to make mayhem for Pakistan, Afghanistan and, ultimately, the United States.

But completing that is another matter all together. As Clinton laid out in yesterday’s press conference, the United States is increasing aid to Pakistan by $110 million—and reaching out to citizens to make additional $5 pledges via text messages. Here’s the breakdown and how the aid will reach Pakistan:

Despite her warmer words for Pakistan’s government, Mrs. Clinton said little of this aid would flow directly to the Pakistani authorities. Most of it will flow to the United Nations and other international aid organizations. Pakistan has been criticized in the past for squandering American assistance.

The latest influx of aid comes on top of $60 million in humanitarian aid that the United States has sent to Pakistan since last August, and $400 million the administration has requested from Congress to improve the counterinsurgency abilities of the Pakistani military.

While the bulk of the $100 million is coming from the State Department — channeled mainly through the Agency for International Development — the Pentagon will contribute $10 million for water trucks, food and large tents equipped with air-conditioning.

Mrs. Clinton emphasized that $26 million of the package was designated to buy grain from Pakistani farmers, which she said would take advantage of the country’s bumper grain crop this year.

Setting aside the important question whether or not this aid channels successfully to Pakistan, Rick Barton argues that without a mobilized Pakistani public committed against the Taliban no amount of is US military hard power and aid will turn the tide. How can the US assist in keeping the Pakistani public—which has already proven its civic force—mobilized to ensure effective civilian rule in Pakistan? Barton calls for American funding of locally controlled TV and radio stations to broadcast the barbarism of the Taliban and ensure continuous responsiveness of the Pakistani government to its citizens.

Now what Barton actually calls for verses current US efforts at ‘public diplomacy’ requires more digging. This CFR publication reviews current efforts at ‘public diplomacy’ in Afghanistan, illustrating that these operations are comprised of US military-run radio stations in Afghanistan. These stations report news, primarily US military operational updates, to locals before the Taliban can disseminate their own message of US humanitarian misdeeds.

Barton argues for greater scope of such efforts into television and radio, local control of content and less emphasis on American military news-updates. Rather these programs should empower locales to bring attention to social ills and examples of good governance.

Such a shift would see ‘public diplomacy’ shift from a focus on beating back extremist propaganda to  providing an independent avenue for public discourse and mobilization.

Starting such a public diplomacy program in Pakistan has risks.  First, will US funds inadvertently go towards anti-American messaging, entertainment programming of little worth or—most alarmingly—into jihadist controlled stations?

But Barton’s provocative idea has its virtues. Showing images of heinous terrorist acts and allowing Pakistanis to push for responsible governance could go a long way in keeping the Pakistani regime responsive to and credible in the eyes of its citzens.

Yet, there are greater dangers than misspent American funds. Stirring the pot of public mobilization can freeze a regime’s forward motion: fanning legitimate public grievances could place unrealistic demands on a regime making real, if slow, forward motion towards effective governance. End-result: A poor, but improving, regime is rejected and replaced with crippled regime.

In any case, the United States must craft a workable, and not simply a military-run propagandist approach to public diplomacy in Pakistan. As Jeanne Bourgault points out in her article Radio a Sound Salvation for Pakistan?:

One recent survey in the area found that “many of the listeners who tune in to militant or mullah-run stations do so largely out of boredom and for want of a better alternative.” By training journalists and helping to set up new radio stations, America and Pakistan can offer this alternative. Supporting local, independent media is a cheap but effective weapon against instability and terror.

From Bourgault one can glean a less ambitious, but perhaps more attainable public diplomacy approach than offered by Barton. Barton’s prescription to instill large-scale mobilization of the Pakistani public must overcome two significant hurdles. First, will not hard-power attained security permit Pakistanis, themselves, to extend their already existing social networks?  And does not such a hard-power success depend on diplomatic and miliatary coordination between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, not to mention agressive counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan more than additional radio stations?

Second, how does one measure the various variable that make-up large-scale social mobilization? The Pakistani public seems very engaged with its regimes current difficulties. Would American aid really produce civic engagement—or merely free-ride on the work of existing Pakistani social networks?

Expanding US jamming operations of extremist media outlets makes sense. And constructing US-controlled radio stations with local staffs that pump out ‘soft propaganda’—exposés on the value of American aid and extremist atrocities—could improve the perception of the United States to Pakistan’s inhabitants. Those two steps are practical steps forward in combatting the Af-Pak terrorist threat; and, furthermore, are preconditions to accessing the value of Barton’s more expansive public diplomacy prescription.

Posted in Pakistan | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Pakistan’s Nuclear (In)security: Fact or Fiction?

Posted by K.E. White on May 19, 2009

Fears over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal have flooded the wires. But how real is this threat?

NPR’s May 6th report paints a worrisome, but not catastrophic picture, of Pakistan’s nukes: stating that the arsenal is secure, but as long as extremists operate in and control more of Pakistan, the risk of theft becomes more likely.

Steven R. David considers the nuclear threat from Pakistan more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis. He views Pakistan’s refusal to add US-manufactured safety devices and divulge, combined with the real possibility that the Pakistani military and government collapse, makes shoring up Pakistan’s civilian government and command-and-control procedures an American foreign policy imperative.

(Note: I believe David’s article betrays a facile reading of history regarding today’s Pakistan vs. yesterday’s Cuba. Vasili Alexandrovich Arkipov’s, Russian submarine B-59’s second captain, voted against the use of nuclear weapons even though in the face of intense U.S. depth-charging. Arkipov’s dissent from his ship’s captain and chief political officer “saved the world from a nuclear cataclysm.” [Michael Krepon’s Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb, page 36])

But Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at Center for American Progress, urges caution. He points to various reasons why the fear of the army collapsing, cooperating with extremists or the Pakistani state collapsing are overblown.

Korb’s key points:

  • “the Pakistani military, which numbers about 1 million soldiers, has enough brute force to prevent the Taliban from breaking out of the rural areas of the frontier provinces and into the heart of Pakistan
  • “It’s also important to note that Islamabad’s intelligence service, or ISI, which has been a renegade operation for nearly two decades, has been brought under the army’s control.
  • the Pakistani Army is composed mostly of Punjabis, and the Taliban insurgents are entirely Pashtun. Therefore, the army won’t let these insurgents, who they see as outsiders, take control of the heart of Pakistan (as opposed to the frontier areas) or the nuclear weapons.
  • The Pakistani Army jealously guards its reputation. In fact, it places a higher priority on its reputation and its interest than that of the country.”

Posted in Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Round-Up: India’s Surprising Election

Posted by K.E. White on May 19, 2009

With all the attention given to Pakistan’s extremist threat, insufficient attention has been paid to India’s recent parliamentary election.

What’s the big news? The incumbent Congress Party (and its allies under the United Progress Alliance) won a resounding re-election. The UPA’s opposition on the right—the more hawkish and socially conservative BJP—lost seats, while its leftist critics were routed. These results defied predictions of a much tighter race.

But more importantly this election, juggling nine national parties and dozens of state parties and 400 million voters, rendered a decisive political judgment in India: awarding the Congress Party enough seats to pursue a national agenda, and not be held hostage by smaller, more insular parties.

The New York Times offers this macro-analysis of the election by Rahul Singh, who ushers in a new era of stable governance (this is the first time a majority government has won re-election in India) and the ascent of a younger, more secular worldview.

(Note: Singh’s last point is only partially true. While the number of under-40 members has increased, the average age of the lower house—Lok Sabha—is higher, making it the 3rd oldest assembly in India’s history.)

Anshul Chaturvedi blames the BJP loss not on policies, age or message but on tactics. His interesting post, drawing on years of following BJP politics, portrays a party made irrelevant by rooting its political power in coalition jockeying and neglecting its base.

The Times of India also offers this article exploring just how the Congress Party overcame the challenge of February’s Mumbai attacks. The article credits Indian foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee’s political tactics with blunting BJP criticism of the Congress Party’s handling of homeland security.

But, as Keith Jones points out, the Congress Party’s sweeping parliamentary victory represents a mere 2 percent increase in popular support. But this line of attack obscures the greater truth. Indians, presented with two national coalition parties and gobs of local parties, opted for UPA coalition led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

How will this election affect US foreign policy? Myra MacDonald, writing for Reuters, shows that tensions between India and Pakistan are still high. This might stymie US efforts to cool tempers so Pakistan can focus on its counter-insurgency, not to mention resolving the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Making progress on these fronts permits strengthened civilian rule in Pakistan, which can provide stability over its border with Afghanistan and battle terrorists posing a direct threat to America and its allies.

But what MacDonald omits in her article is the significance of the US-India nuclear deal brokered by the Bush administration. The nuclear deal threatened UPA’s parliamentary control in 2008. With the Congress Party’s reestablished mandate, this nuclear linkage may assist future diplomatic engagement.

Will a now strengthened UPA, popular Obama administration and extremist-battling Pakistan be able to make tough decisions regarding Pakistan?

Maybe. But with (a perhaps duplicitous) Pakistani regime ramping up its nuclear arsenal, the road ahead will be bumpy.

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